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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
CaseNo.20050282-CA 
ADAM KYLE PRICE, : 
Defendant/Appellant : 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002). The appellant, Adam Kyle Price was convicted of aggravated 
assault, Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (2004), a second degree felony. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Whether Price's trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel when he 
(a) attempted to introduce evidence of three prior convictions involving violence to 
establish the chief prosecution witness's violent propensities and to rebut the victim's 
testimony as to peaceful tendencies without certified copies of the convictions on the first 
day of trial; (b) failed to ensure the witness's appearance on the second day of trial 
despite the court's order requiring the witness to make himself available; (c) failed to 
request a continuance on the second day of trial after discovering that the witness was not 
present; (d) failed to inquire into what role, if any, the state's case manager played in the 
witness's unavailability; (e) obtained admissible evidence of only one of three of the 
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witness's assault convictions; and, (f) effectively failed to mention the exhibits reflecting 
directly upon Ihe chief prosecution witness's credibility and violent character during 
closing argument when those exhibits were admitted without any comment or testimony 
that would have highlighted their relevance. 
Standard of Review: 
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, fffa defendant must 
show (1) that counsel's performance was so deficient as to fall below an 
objective standard of reasonableness and (2) that but for counsel's deficient 
performance there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial 
would have been different.'" 
Myers v. State. 2004 UT 31, ^ 20, 94 P.3d 211, quoting Wickham v. Galetka, 2002 UT 
72, f^ 19, 61 P. 3d 978 (additional citation omitted). The reviewing court presumes the 
challenged actions were sound trial strategy. State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 
1990). 
Preservation: This issue is appropriately raised for the first time on appeal when 
the defendant is represented by counsel other than trial counsel, and the trial record is 
adequate to permit a decision on the issue. State v. Strain, 885 P.2d 810, 814 n.l (Utah 
Ct. App. 1994), citing State v. Humphries, 818 P.2d 1027, 1029 (Utah 1991). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution is attached as Addendum C. 
Article ], § 12 of the Utah Constitution is attached as Addendum D. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-402 (2004) is attached as Addendum E. 
Utah R. Evid. 405 is attached as Addendum F. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On June 3, 2004, an Information was filed charging Price with one count of 
aggravated assault in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (2004), a second degree 
felony, and one count of unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-37a-5 (2004), a class B misdemeanor. (R. 1-2.) Price's case, No. 
041903671 FS, was linked to the case of Jared Mead Gillett, No. 041903672 FS, as both 
Price and Gillett were alleged to have assaulted Thomas Armijo. (R. 34.) A preliminary 
hearing was held October 7, 2004. The unlawful possession charge against Price was 
dismissed, and he was bound over with co-defendant Gillett for trial on the assault 
charges. (R. 47-48.) A jury trial was held January 6, 7 and 10, 2005. Price and Gillett 
were found guilty of aggravated assault in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 
(2004). (R. 93.) On March 14, 2005, Price was sentenced to spend from one to fifteen 
years at the Utah State Prison, pay a fine of $18,500, and pay restitution in the amount of 
$11,693; the prison sentence and fine were suspended, and Price was placed on three 
years probation with 365 days in jail. (R. 104-107; the Sentence/Judgment/Commitment/ 
Order is attached hereto as Addendum A.) Price's Notice of Appeal was filed March 24, 
2005. (R. 109.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The afternoon of May 28, 2004 began with Adam Price's co-defendant, Jared 
Gillett, selling plasma for money to buy alcohol. He was joined in the selling of plasma 
by Thomas Armijo. (R. 132, at 276:2-9.) Gillett then went to his sister's house where he 
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was joined by Price. (R. 132, at 276:6-277:8.) Gillett and Price shared a full bottle of 
whiskey. (R. 132, at 277:17-20.) Armijo then arrived, after which he and Gillett walked 
to a trailer located a short distance from the house where they drank from a bottle of rum, 
most of which Armijo had already consumed. (R. 132, at 277:21-278: L0.) Gillett 
returned to the house for a short while before leaving to buy beer; Armijo initially went to 
EO's, a nearby pool hall, and then returned to the house while Gillett was still off buying 
beer. (R. 132, at 279:25-280:14.) 
Several altercations between Armijo and Price led up to the one that gave rise to 
the assault charges. Each witness, especially Armijo and Price, gave varying accounts of 
each, thus putting their credibility squarely at issue as the state alleged assault and Price 
claimed self defense. The first skirmish between Price and Armijo occurred shortly after 
Armijo's return to the house. (R. 132, at 280:15-20.) Armijo says he 'tapped" Price 
farewell on the shoulder, to which Price took exception. Armijo says he told Price to "go 
ahead and hit me back," upon which Price slugged him in the jaw. (R. 131, at 74:14-23.) 
Price says he was telling Armijo that he could not box due to a shoulder injury when 
Armijo knocked him to the ground with a combination of punches. Price got to his feet 
and hit Armijo once. (R. 132, at 338:16-339:19.) 
Then, according to Armijo, he was leaving the house to avoid more conflict when 
Priced chased after him. They wrestled before Gillett intervened to help restrain Price. 
Armijo walked across the street. (R. 131, 79:24-80:9.) Price says that before Armijo 
went across the street, Armijo charged and started hitting him. (R. 132, 340:1-2.) 
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On the other side of the street, Armijo says he saw Price approaching so he left 
before there was more fighting. Armijo says he saw Price and Gillett return to the house. 
(R. 131, at 80:8-13.) Price says he walked across the street to ask Armijo about his 
behavior, and that more punches were exchanged. (R. 132, at 340:7-21.) 
Armijo went back to the pool hall, and Price and Gillett returned to the house. 
Soon thereafter, Price and Gillett were walking down the street that runs in front of the 
pool hall to a gas station. (R. 132, at 341:1-16.) This is where the final confrontation 
occurred. Price says they were walking past the pool hall when Armijo came up from 
behind them, calling them "mother f- ," and challenging them to a fight. Price says 
Armijo started swinging and immediately connected with several punches. Price felt 
threatened with serious bodily injury based upon the fights earlier that day. (R. 132, at 
342:1-343:24.) Armijo claims that upon leaving the pool hall, Price and Gillett 
approached him, sprayed him in the face with mace, hit him in the head with a miniature 
bat, and beat him up. (R. 131, at 83:4-85:15.) 
Armijo was the state's first witness. During his testimony, counsel for Gillett 
asked a question about something Armijo could not recall. Gillett's attorney refreshed 
Armijo's recollection by having Armijo read from the preliminary hearing transcript. (R. 
131, at 98:2-99:11.) Moments later, Armijo conceded he could not remember the details 
of the fights that immediately preceded the one from which the assault charges stemmed. 
(This was following Armijo's claims of never being the aggressor in those prior fights, 
which testimony is summarized, supra.) He contended, however, that he would never 
have started any of those fights because he is a peaceful man: "that ain't my style to do 
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that. That ain't my class to do that. ... Yeah, it ain't, it ain't in my character to be violent 
or aggressive, no." (R. 131, at 102:9-103:1; see also R. 131, at 106:12 ["I'm a spiritual, 
peaceful guy, yeah."]) 
Under cross examination by Price's attorney about Armijo's self-proclaimed non-
violent character, the following exchange occurred when Price's attorney attempted to 
confront Armijo with evidence of prior convictions for assault: 
Q. Mr. Armijo, I have a few questions for you. Now, you just stated it's 
not in your character to be violent, correct? 
A. Exactly, (inaudible) provoked, unless someone hits me, then I'll 
defend myself and I don't think that's being violent. 
Q. Let's talk about some previous things that have happened to you in 
your life. 
A. Can he do that? 
Q. Now, you have been convicted of a violent act before, right? 
A. No, I haven't. 
Q. You have never been convicted of a violent act? 
A. I've been charged but never convicted. 
Price's attorney: If I may approach, Your Honor. 
The Court: Sure. 
Q. I'm handing you what's been marked Defendant's Exhibit 1, 2 and 3. 
Just take a look at the second page of Defendant's Exhibit No. 1. 
A. I can't even read this, sorry. 
Q. Let me ask you a specific - you can't read it at all? 
A. No, I can't. 
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(R. 131, at 103:6-104:1.) 
Price's attorney then sought to rebut Armijo's claim of nonviolent character 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-402(5)(d) (2004)(regarding claims of self defense, the 
trier of fact may consider another's prior violent acts in determining imminence of force, 
and reasonableness of the defendant's response thereto) with evidence of several prior 
assault convictions. Armijo, however, denied any recollection of the convictions, and 
claimed not to be able to read the documents offered to refresh his recollection. (R. 131, 
at 104:2-105:11.) Armijo said the reason he could not read the documents was because of 
blurry and double vision caused by the assault. (R. 131, at 120:1-5.) 
Following a sidebar, the jury was excused. Price's attorney intended to refresh 
Armijo's recollection as to the convictions by reading from Armijo's rap sheet.1 The 
state, based upon prior communications with defense counsel, did not object to the use of 
prior convictions for the purpose of rebutting claims of a peaceful character, but it did 
object to the use of a rap sheet instead of certified copies of the convictions. The court 
ruled that Price's attorney could, outside the presence of the jury, read aloud from the rap 
sheet to refresh Armijo's recollection of the prior convictions. If, however, Armijo still 
denied any recollection of the convictions, the attorney could not introduce the rap sheet 
as evidence, but could do so with certified copies of the convictions. (R. 131, at 120:21-
124:9.) 
1
 During this exchange, defense counsel initially and erroneously claimed to base his right 
to introduce evidence of prior convictions upon Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 (2004)(the 
misdemeanor assault statute), rather than § 76-2-402 (2004)(the self defense statute). 
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Price's attorney attempted to refresh Armijo's recollection as to (1) a guilty plea 
from April 1991 (the transcript states "inaudible" where, presumably, other details 
regarding an assault conviction were read); (2) a guilty plea in October 1991 to the lesser 
charge of assault in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 (1991), a class B 
misdemeanor; and, (3) another guilty plea to the lesser charge of assault, a class B 
misdemeanor, in November 1992. Armijo denied any recollection of these convictions. 
(R. 131, at 124:9-125:12.) 
Upon the jury's return, Price's attorney asked Armijo a few more questions. 
Price's attorney told the court that he might want to call Armijo during Price's case-in-
chief the next day. The court instructed, "Mr. Armijo, you're free to leave but they may 
get in touch with you and ask you to come back later on." (R. 131, at 129:9-130:24.) 
Trial resumed the following day. Toward the conclusion of the morning session, 
Price's attorney went outside the courtroom to locate Armijo so he could be recalled to 
the stand. Armijo was not there. Price's attorney had not informed Armijo that his 
attendance that day was required. Armijo, in fact, had appeared earlier that morning and 
left a note with Salt Lake City Detective Nelson apparently stating that since his presence 
was not required, he was leaving. After Price's counsel returned to the courtroom without 
Armijo, the jury was excused and the following exchange occurred: 
The Court: All right, counsel, you can be seated. I take it Mr. Armijo is 
not outside? 
Mr. Simms [Price's attorney]: That's correct. If I may approach? 
The Court: Sure. 
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Mr. Simms: I've shown this to co-defendant's counsel and Mr. Bown as 
well. 
Mr. Bown (state's counsel): Mr. Armijo mentioned to Detective Nelson 
that - or was it today? 
Det. Nelson: Yes, sir, this morning when I first saw him. 
Mr. Bown: That he did not get a communication yesterday and so 
(inaudible). 
The Court: Okay. I saw the note so.... 
Mr. Simms: Your Honor, if he's not going to be available, I just have a 
portion of videotape of his testimony yesterday. I'd just like to submit that 
in front of the jury. 
(R. 132, at 326:7-23.) Price's attorney did not request a continuance to secure Armijo's 
presence. Price's attorney did not request to voir dire or otherwise examine Det. Nelson, 
the state's case manager at trial as to Det. Nelson's conversation with Armijo prior to 
Armijo's departure. 
The portion of the videotape referenced by Price's attorney was from the first day 
of trial when Armijo refreshed his recollection from the preliminary hearing transcript. 
Price's attorney intended to impeach Armijo's claim to be unable to read the rap sheet 
that contained the prior convictions. (R. 132, at 327:3-13.) The short excerpt from the 
video tape (Def. Ex. 5) was played for the jury without any explanation as to its 
significance as illustrated by the following exchange: 
The Court: Again, I'll note the [state's] objection but overrule it and 
receive Exhibit 5. It's just a very brief clip from the videotape of his 
testimony yesterday, is that correct? 
(Defendant's Exhibit 5 received) 
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Mr. Simms: That's correct. 
The Court: We'll play that again for the jury. 
Mr. Simms: Yes, can I set it up in terms of why or should I just play the 
video only? 
The Court: You can't be a witness for us here. I think you probably 
have to just play the videotape. 
(Whereupon the videotape of Mr. Armijo's testimony was played.) 
The Court: Thank you. When the time comes, you can argue your 
reasoning in showing that. 
Mr. Simms: Thank you. Let me call Mr. Price, Adam Price. 
(R. 132, at 336:25-337:15.) 
In closing argument, however, Price's attorney's only reference to the video was, 
at best, confusing. When discussing Armijo's violent propensities, Price's attorney said: 
So we know he's violent and that he struck first and we know that he had a 
violent history although he conveniently couldn't read - he could read when 
Mr. Hogan [co-defendant's attorney] presented something to him and we 
saw that on the videotape, but conveniently, he couldn't read when I was 
presenting that to him. 
(R. 132, at 403:13-18.) No further attempt was made to connect the videotape to the 
impeachment. 
By the second day of trial, Price's attorney had obtained a certified copy of one of 
Armijo's three convictions. It was for the October 1991 assault. (Def. Ex. 4, attached as 
Addendum B.) With the absence of Armijo, Defendant's Exhibit 4 was received and 
published without any comment, testimony or explanation to the jury. (R. 132, at 336:2-
16.) The closest Price's attorney came to mentioning Defendant's Exliibit 4 or Armijo's 
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prior convictions for violent offenses during closing argument was the brief passage 
quoted above (R. 132, at 403:13-18). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Price is constitutionally guaranteed the effective assistance of trial counsel when 
defending against charges that threaten loss of liberty. Price received ineffective 
assistance, however, because his attorney's performance fell below an objective standard 
of reasonableness. 
Armijo's violent character was an essential element of Price's self-defense claim. 
Despite the fact that it was not authenticated and likely contained prejudicial information 
irrelevant to Armijo's violent character, Price's attorney arrived at court with only a rap 
sheet, not certified copies of the assault convictions. When it was time to "prove up" 
Armijo's convictions, he was unable to do so because he had not bothered to obtain 
certified copies of the prior convictions. 
At Price's attorney's request, the judge warned Armijo he would have to testify 
again if Price's attorney requested that he do so. Price's attorney, however, made no such 
request. So while Armijo appeared at court the next morning, he soon left. Price's 
attorney did not request a continuance to secure Armijo's presence. Nor did Price's 
attorney examine the state's case manager as to what role he played in Armijo's 
departure. 
Because Armijo was unavailable when it was time to impeach his claimed 
inability to read from the rap sheet, the brief videotape was played that showed Armijo 
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silently reading from a hearing transcript - without explanatory comment or testimony. 
Because Armijo was unavailable when it was time to establish Armijo's violent 
propensities, a single certified copy of one conviction was admitted and published 
without explanatory comment or testimony. 
Price's attorney did not have certified copies of the other two convictions. 
Closing argument, therefore, was the only opportunity Price's attorney would have 
to explain the significance of the video and the certified copy of the conviction. He 
mentioned the video once in passing, and did not mention either the conviction or the 
record thereof. 
But for Price's attorney's substandard performance, there is a reasonable 
probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different. This was a case that 
depended entirely upon credibility. It pitted the word of the co-defendants against that of 
Armijo. The evidence was close. Anything bearing upon the Armijo's credibility could 
have affected the verdict. Anything that accredited the reasonableness of Price's belief 
that substantial force was required to thwart Armijo's imminent attack could have 
affected the verdict. The lack of basic preparation by Price's attorney, along with the 
attorney's failure to ensure Armijo's appearance the second day of trial, prevented the 
jury from receiving and understanding this crucial evidence. 
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ARGUMENT 
Mr. Price Received Ineffective Assistance of Counsel When Trial Counsel Failed to 
Fully Exploit the State's Chief Witness's Credibility Before the Jury. 
Both the federal and Utah Constitutions guarantee an accused's right to effective 
assistance of counsel. U.S. Const, amends. VI and XIV; Utah Const. Art. I, § 12; see 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). A defendant claiming ineffective 
assistance of counsel "must show (1) that counsel's performance was so deficient as to 
fall below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) that but for counsel's deficient 
performance there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have 
been different.'1 State v. Montoya, 2004 UT 5, f 23, 84 P.3d 1183, quoting Wickham v. 
Galetka, 2002 UT 72, \ 19, 61 P.3d 978. 
Ineffective assistance sufficient to undermine confidence in a jury's verdict may 
arise in numerous contexts. E.g., State v. Humphries, 818 P.2d 1027, 1029-30 (Utah 
1991)(failure to object to the prosecutor's comment to the jury regarding a witness's 
invocation of her testimonial privilege); State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 187-89 (Utah 
1990)(failure to investigate the availability of prospective defense witnesses); State v. 
Nelson, 2004 UT App 421, 3-5 (Memorandum Decision)(failure to file the required 
statutory notice of alibi)(attached as Addendum G); State v. Bleazard, 2004 UT App 351, 
4 (Memorandum Decision)(failure to provide adequate notice of defense witnesses and 
failure to prepare a cautionary instruction to mitigate the prejudicial effect of evidence) 
(attached as Addendum H); State v. Crestani, 111 P.2d 1085, 1090-92 (Utah Ct. App. 
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1989)(failure to prepare defense witnesses and failure to review the records obtained by 
the prosecution). 
Below, Section A focuses upon trial counsel's substandard performance. Section 
B examines the prejudice caused thereby. 
A. Trial Counsel's Performance Fell Below an Objective Standard of 
Reasonableness. 
Trial counsel's performance fell below an objective level of reasonableness when 
he (1) had nothing but a rap sheet with which to challenge Armijo's claim of peaceful 
character the first day of trial, (2) did not ensure Armijo's presence the second day of 
trial, (3) did not request a continuance during which Armijo's presence could be secured, 
(4) did not seek to question the state's case manager about his conversation with Armijo 
just before Armijo left the courthouse to determine what role the state agent played in 
Armijo's unavailability, (5) obtained the certified copy of only one of three convictions, 
and (6) effectively failed to tie the videotaped impeachment and the certified conviction 
to Armijo's lack of credibility and violent propensities during closing argument. Each of 
these failings is addressed below. 
Because ineffective assistance claims often fail upon speculation that trial counsel 
may have based decisions on trial strategy - no matter how unwise such decisions appear 
in retrospect - the likelihood that any of the following actions were tactical in nature is 
also addressed. E.g., Myers v. State, 2004 UT 31, f 20 ("the defendant must overcome 
the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered 
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sound trial strategy"), quoting Templin, 805 P.2d at 186, quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
689. 
1. Failed to Have Certified Copies of the Convictions Ready, 
Armijo's violent character was a theme central to Price's self defense claim. 
Utah's self defense statute reads in pertinent part: 
§ 76-2-402 (2004). Force in defense of person — Forcible felony defined 
(1) A person is justified in threatening or using force against another when 
and to the extent that he or she reasonably believes that force is necessary to 
defend himself or a third person against such other's imminent use of 
unlawful force. However, that person is justified in using force intended or 
likely to cause death or serious bodily injury only if he or she reasonably 
believes that force is necessary to prevent death or serious bodily injury to 
himself or a third person as a result of the other's imminent use of unlawful 
force, or to prevent the commission of a forcible felony. 
(2) A person is not justified in using force under the circumstances specified 
in Subsection (1) if he or she: 
(c) (i) was the aggressor or was engaged in a combat by agreement, 
unless he withdraws from the encounter and effectively communicates to the 
other person his intent to do so and, notwithstanding, the other person 
continues or threatens to continue the use of unlawful force; 
(5) In determining imminence or reasonableness under Subsection (1), the 
trier of fact may consider, but is not limited to, any of the following factors: 
(d) the other's prior violent acts or violent propensities.... 
Price claimed to have employed only that force necessary to protect himself from 
death or serious injury in a fight started by Armijo. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-402(1), 
(2)(c)(i) (2004). Price testified Armijo started the fight by approaching him and Gillett 
from behind and hitting him several times before he could respond. (R. 132, at 342:5-
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343:24.) Price testified that he hit and twice kicked Armijo because he was afraid Armijo 
was going to attack him just as had occurred earlier that day, and that he stopped fighting 
as soon as the danger had dissipated. (E.g., R. 132, at 346:4-347:22.) Price was afraid to 
the point of concluding that he had no option but to fight. (R. 132, at 350:8-20.) In fact, 
Price believed he had been more seriously injured than Armijo during the final 
altercation. (R. 132, at 348:6-12.) Whether Price went too far was a key issue argued to 
the jury. (R. 132, at 407:21-24 [Price's attorney: "If in fact there was a blow that was 
too far, which one was it?"]; id, at 410:21-24 [the state: "There's no reason to believe 
that Tom [Armijo] was going to be - this force was necessary for Mr. Armijo to prevent 
the death or serious bodily injury to himself or Adam [Price] or Jared [Gillett] or a third 
person"].) 
So central to Price's self defense claim was evidence of Armijo's violent acts and 
propensities, see Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-402(5)(d) (2004), that Price's attorney and the 
state discussed before trial Price's desire to introduce evidence of Armijo's assault 
convictions. The state offered no objection provided that something more than a rap sheet 
was available to prove up the convictions. (R. 131, at 120:21-122:24.) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-402(5)(d) (2004)(the trier of fact may consider the other's 
violent acts or violent propensities) effectively designates the victim's violent character as 
a key element to a self-defense claim. Pursuant to Utah R. Evid. 405(b), an essential 
element of a defense may be established through evidence of specific instances of 
conduct. While decided under the predecessors of Utah R. Evid. 404 and 405, Utah case 
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law expressly permits a defendant claiming self defense to introduce evidence of the 
victim's prior criminal convictions: 
Because the defendant's defense of self defense placed the issue of 
deceased's character in evidence, defendant was entitled to prove the 
turbulent and violent character of the deceased. Evidence of a victim's 
turbulent and violent character is relevant to prove that the deceased may 
have been the aggressor, or that defendant, if he knew of those character 
traits, was fearful of the deceased. 
This State, however, has opted for a more limited type of evidence than 
[sic] can be used to prove specific instances of misconduct. To prevent the 
trial from being drawn off into pathways collateral to the central issue of 
guilt, Rules 46 and 47 of Utah Rules of Evidence do not permit evidence of 
specific acts of violence, short of criminal conviction, to prove the 
deceased's violent character. [Footnote omitted.] In addition to evidence of 
a criminal conviction, reputation evidence of a victim's character may also 
be adduced. 
State v. Howell, 649 P.2d 91, 96 (Utah 1982); State v. Clayton, 658 P.2d 624, 626 (Utah 
1983)(same).2 
2
 Alternatively, Armijo's violent character was also admissible pursuant to Utah R. Evid. 
404(b). Under that rule, evidence of prior bad acts may be admissible for purposes other 
than conforming behavior. In this case, Armijofs prior assault convictions were probative 
of similarity to the instant incident. In addition, other aspects of Rule 404(b)fs 
requirement were also met. First, the prosecutor was on notice that defense counsel was 
going to use the convictions. (R: 131, at 122.) Second, Armijo's prior assault convictions 
are relevant under Utah R. Evid. 401, in that they tended "to make the existence of any 
fact that is of consequence to the determination of [self-defense] more probable or less 
probable than it would be without the evidence." Third, though Armijo's prior 
misdemeanor convictions would normally be inadmissible under Rule 404(b), Utah Code 
Ann. §76-2-402(5)(d) allows a trier of fact to consider a victim's prior violent acts or 
violent propensities when determining the reasonableness of force in self-defense. See 
discussion, supra. Most importantly, the very nature of Armijo's violent propensities 
renders the probative value of his prior assault convictions more probative than 
prejudicial under Utah R. Evid. 403. 
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But, as the state had warned Price's attorney prior to trial, and as the attorney 
should have known in any event, evidence of a criminal conviction must come in through 
either the convicted person or a certified copy of the conviction. Utah R. Evid. 902(4); 
State v. Peterson, 560 P.2d 1387, 1390 (Utah 1977)(best evidence of a conviction is a 
record of the conviction); State v. Higginbotham, 917 P.2d 545, 549-550 (Utah 
1966)(strict compliance with requirement of certification by records custodian required 
when introducing evidence of prior criminal conviction), citing State v. Long, 721 P.2d 
483, 486 (Utah 1986)(same); State v. Lamorie, 610 P.2d 342, 345-346 (Utah 1980)(same; 
quoting Rule 68(1), the predecessor to Rule 902(4)). 
The weighing provisions of Utah R. Evid. 403 (probative value versus unfair 
prejudice or confusion) also relates to Price's attorney's apparent intent to introduce a 
"rap sheet" into evidence. A rap sheet typically summarizes arrests, charges and criminal 
dispositions. It may well include information about arrests and charges that did not result 
in convictions, or that resulted in convictions irrelevant to the matter at hand. No 
reasonable attorney would expect such information to be received into evidence. 
When the data read from the rap sheet failed to refresh Mr. Armijo's recollection 
of the three convictions for violent offenses, Price's attorney made no attempt to further 
impeach Armijo or to introduce into evidence the rap sheet. He simply asked Armijo a 
few more questions about another incident. (R. 131, at 124:9-11.) Price's attorney 
informed the court that he may call Armijo in Price's case-in-chief the following day, and 
the court advised Armijo: "Mr. Armijo. you're free to leave but they may get in touch 
with you and ask you to come back later on." (R. 131, at 130:14-24.) 
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Price's attorney knew that getting evidence of Armijo's prior convictions to the 
jury was crucial to Price's defense. That is why he discussed this very issue with the 
state prior to trial. The attorney knew the state would object if he attempted to get the rap 
sheet into evidence. He knew or should have known that the record of any conviction 
moved into evidence must comply with the certification requirements of Rule 902(4). 
Yet, he undertook cross-examination of the most important prosecution witness armed 
with naught but a rap sheet. As a result, with Armijo's claims of living a life of peace 
and love fresh in the jury's ears, Price's attorney was unable to prove up three 
convictions for violent behavior. 
This was not a tactical decision. Price had given Armijo the opportunity of 
admitting to the assault convictions, but Armijo frustrated this attempt by feigning an 
inability to read the rap sheet and then by denying any recollection of the three 
convictions. Moreover, Price's attorney did introduce authenticated evidence the next 
day - albeit evidence of but one of the three convictions. 
2. Failed to Ensure Armijo's Presence. 
All was not lost, however, as the trial court warned Armijo he could again be 
called as a witness. (R. 131, at 130:14-24.) Indeed, Armijo came to the courthouse the 
second morning of trial. (R. 132, at 326:13-16 [Det. Nelson, the state's case manager 
below, spoke with Armijo that morning].) But Armijo did not get "a communication" 
from Price's attorney, so he left. (R. 132, at 326:13-19.) 
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Pursuant to the trial court's instruction, Armijo was right outside the courtroom the 
second morning of trial. All Price's attorney had to do was stick his head outside the door 
and say, "Stick around." But he did not. Armijo left because of the attorney's failure. 
This was not a tactical decision. Had Price's attorney not intended to call Armijo, 
he would not have told the court the first day of trial, in the presence of the jury, that he 
might do so in Price's case-in-chief; nor would Price's attorney have told the court just 
before lunch the second day of trial, also in the presence of the jury, that was calling 
Armijo back to the stand, then actually leaving the courtroom to look for him. 
3. Failed to Request a Continuance. 
Without Armijo, the best Price's attorney could do was show the video tape of 
Armijo reading from a hearing transcript the day before to impeach his claimed inability 
to read the rap sheet, and to introduce certified copies of the three convictions. As noted 
in Section B, infra, these are, at best, poor seconds when compared to exposing a key 
witness's untruths before a jury. Price's attorney, therefore, should have requested a 
continuance. 
Granting a continuance is within the sound discretion of the court. E.g., State v. 
Mooseman, 542 P.2d 1093, 1094 (Utah 1975). In this case, however, sending someone 
out to fetch Armijo to testify later that afternoon, or telling him to appear the next 
morning, would have cost little more than slight inconvenience in exchange for 
immeasurable gain. Moreover, had the trial court refused the attorney's request, the issue 
would at least have been reserved for appeal. 
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Rather than request a continuance, however, Price's attorney simply proceeded to 
show the snippet of video that showed Armijo reading the day before - without any 
comment as to the video's significance; and he introduced into evidence one certified 
copy of one conviction - also without any comment as to its significance. 
To proceed without Armijo can hardly be called a strategic choice. Price's 
attorney, after all, believed calling Armijo was important enough to have the trial court 
order Armijo to make himself available the following day. Price's attorney then stopped 
the proceedings the second day of trial to exit the courtroom looking for Armijo. 
4. Failed to Question the Case Manager about Armijo's Departure. 
Detective Nelson, the state's case manager at trial, is certainly an agent of the 
prosecution team. He was the only prosecution witness allowed to remain when all other 
witnesses but the defendants were excluded. 
When an agent of the state interferes with defense counsel's ability to protect the 
defendant's fundamental rights under the Sixth Amendment, ineffective assistance is 
presumed. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692; U.S. v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 n.25 (1984). 
In the case at bar, Armijo and Det. Nelson spoke at the courthouse the second 
morning of trial. Armijo apparently gave Det. Nelson a note - although counsel's failure 
to make a record of the note's contents prevents any consideration thereof. (R., 132, at 
326:7-23.) Entirely plausible is that Det. Nelson spoke with Armijo in a manner that led 
to Armijo's departure before Armijo could be called to the stand where his credibility and 
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peaceful character were sure to be attacked. Had Det. Nelson played any such role, a 
presumption of ineffective assistance of counsel would arise. See Strickland, supra. 
Price was entitled to an attorney that would at least ask what role Det. Nelson 
played in Armijo's untimely departure. The questioning could have occurred as witness 
voir dire, without calling the jury back in, and would have required only two or three 
minutes. No conceivable tactical advantage was gained from failing to question Det. 
Nelson, or in requesting that the court inquire into the specifics of Armijo's departure, 
outside the presence of the jury. 
5. Failed to Secure Certified Copies of Two of the Three Convictions. 
Armijo's rap sheet disclosed three convictions for assault. They were dated April 
24, 1992, October 18, 1991, and November 4, 1992. Even though Armijo was not there 
to confront personally with the three convictions, at least Price's attorney could admit into 
evidence a certified copy of each conviction. 
But the only certified copy of a conviction offered into evidence was for the 
October 18, 1991 offense. (Def. Ex. 4.) Price's attorney had failed to get certified copies 
of the other two convictions. 
The state had no objection to the other convictions coming in provided they were 
evidenced by authenticated records. The court would have let them in, as evidenced by 
its receipt of Defendant's Exhibit 4, especially absent objection by the state attorney. The 
only person who prevented their introduction was Price's attorney - because he failed to 
get authenticated copies. 
22 
This was not a tactical decision. Just the day before, Price's attorney sought to 
secure testimony regarding all three assault convictions. No advantage was gained by 
introducing just one of the three convictions. 
6. Failed to Tie the Video and Single Conviction to Armijo's Credibility and 
Character. 
At least Price's attorney still had the opportunity to attack the key prosecution 
witness's credibility during closing argument. 
The jury had seen Armijo refresh his recollection from a hearing transcript both in 
person and via the brief video clip. But tying that evidence to Armijo's lack of credibility 
would require the attorney's explanation because the video had previously been played 
without any accompanying comment or explanation. (R. 132, at 336:25-337:14.) 
The jury would have before it the certified copy of a single assault conviction. 
(Def. Ex. 4.) Again, tying that evidence to Armijo's lack of credibility would require the 
attorney's explanation during closing argument because the exhibit was received and 
published without any accompanying comment or testimony. (R. 132, at 336:2-16.) 
Price's attorney, however, mentioned the video tape once - with but a cryptic 
reference to its significance: 
So we know he's violent and that he struck first and we know that he had a 
violent history although he conveniently couldn't read - he could read when 
Mr. Hogan [co-defense counsel] presented something to him and we saw 
that on the videotape, but conveniently, he couldn't read when I was 
presenting that to him. 
(R. 132, at 403:13-18.) Price's attorney did not once mention Defendant's Exhibit 4, the 
certified copy of the conviction, or the conviction itself. 
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Failing to tie visual, tangible evidence to the key witness's lack of credibility and 
violent propensities cannot be called a tactical decision. Price's attorney did mention 
these issues, although most ineffectively. Moreover, Price's attorney was not concerned 
about having too little time in which to present his closing arguments. When the trial 
court, upon the state's request, extended from twenty to thirty minutes the time for each 
attorney present his argument, Price's attorney responded, "I don't need 30 minutes, Your 
Honor." (R. 132, at 330:3-17.) 
B. But for Counsel's deficient Performance There Is a Reasonable Probability 
that the Outcome Would Have Been Different 
Price's attorney's failure to attack either the credibility of the most important 
prosecution witness when the entire case turned on credibility, or the witness's self-
anointment as a peaceful and non-aggressive man when the witness's violent character 
was a central issue to Price's self-defense claim, likely affected the outcome of the trial. 
See Montoya. 2004 UT 5, % 23, quoting Wickham, 2002 UT 72, ^ 19. 
The attorney's most significant failures lay in not having ready the certified copies 
of the convictions the first day of trial, not ensuring Armijo's presence the second day of 
trial, and obtaining admissible evidence of only one of Armijo's three prior assault 
charges. Taken together, however, the mistakes detailed above (Section A, subsections 1-
6), had the likely effect of cementing his client's conviction. 
Constitutional due process of law is not satisfied where perjured testimony of a 
material witness is likely to have affected the jury's judgment. "Particularly is this true 
where the testimony of that witness was crucial in establishing proof of the elements of 
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the crime charged and the overall circumstances of the testimony offered bore directly on 
the guilt or innocence of the commission of the crime itself...." United States v. 
Guillette, 404 F.Supp. 1360, 1369-70 (D. Conn. 1975). In the case at bar, Armijo's was 
the only direct testimony probative of the elements of assault, and it was the only direct 
testimony offered to rebut Price's self defense claim. 
An inability to exploit a key witness's falsehoods may warrant a new trial. See 
United States v. Pacelli, 491 F.2d 1108, 1119 (2d Cir. 1974) new trial ordered where 
prosecution failed to disclose evidence relevant to impeaching material witness's 
credibility), cert denied 419 U.S. 826, and 424 U.S. 911 (1976). The right to confront 
one's accusers is vital to the truth-seeking process: 
When confrontation is available the accused has an opportunity, not only of 
testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness, but of 
compelling him to stand face-to-face with the jury in order that they may 
look at him and judge by his demeanor and the manner in which he gives his 
testimony whether he is worth of belief. [Footnote omitted.] 
State v. Anderson, 612 P.2d 778, 785 (Utah 1980). 
In Guillette, supra, the credibility of the government's informant was constantly 
under attack. His recollection of key events differed from law enforcement officers, and 
differed as well from other proven credible evidence. Some particulars of his testimony 
were nothing short of "fantastic." 404 F.Supp. at 1371. Thus it could not be said that the 
informant's credibility was anywhere close to pure to begin with. Nonetheless, there was 
additional evidence that would have reflected upon the informant's credibility that the 
government failed to disclose, including evidence of a psychiatric disorder and ten checks 
on which the informant signed his name in a manner slightly different from how he 
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described his signature under cross examination. Id., at 1371-72. In language especially 
relevant to Price's attorney's failure to nail down Armijo's violent tendencies and lack of 
credibility, the Guillette court observed: 
Experience teaches trial counsel that one of the most dangerous witnesses is 
one who has no hesitancy to Till in' crucial testimony or to tell half-truths. 
A supplement to that theorem, however, teaches that the testimony of such a 
witness can be totally destroyed where adequate background information 
concerning the witness has been developed and a thorough preparation of 
the fads carried out. 
Id, at 1371. 
Armijo was the only witness to claim Price started the altercations back at the 
house earlier that day. He is the only witness to accuse Price and Gillett of later attacking 
him in front of the pool hall. By contrast, both Price and Gillett testified that Armijo 
initiated the f Lnal altercation with verbal threats and then by actually hitting Price several 
times before Price could respond. (R. 132, at 342:1-343:24 [Price]; R. 132, at 287:16-22 
[Gillett].) Even when interviewed separately by Det. Nelson shortly after their respective 
arrests the night of the altercation (the videotaped interviews were shown to the jury), 
both Price and Gillett stated they were attacked by Armijo. (R. 132, at 405:21-24.) It was 
Armijo's word against Price and Gillett's, and credibility was the key. 
Armijo's claims to be a man of peace may well have struck the jury as "half-
truths." See Guillette, 404 F.Supp. at 1371. Especially telling was Armijo's plaintiff 
query when counsel approached him with the rap sheet immediately following Armijo's 
declaration that he was not a violent or aggressive man: "Can he do that?" (R. 131, at 
103:13.) That was when an attorney equipped with three certified convictions could have 
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shown Armijo for the untruthful, violent man he is. That was when the jury would have 
seen Armijo falter. That is when the jury should have been allowed to critically evaluate 
Armijo5s lonely claim that it was he who was attacked and he who was immediately 
rendered defenseless. 
But, of course, that never happened. Because it never happened, Price was 
convicted of aggravated assault. 
CONCLUSION 
Because Price did not receive effective assistance of counsel, the aggravated 
assault conviction should be reversed, and the matter remanded for a new trial. 
DATED t h i s / / # W of July, 2005. 
John Pace 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDA 
Addendum A 
3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
ADAM KYLE PRICE, 
Defendant. 
PRESENT 
Clerk: marlened 
Prosecutor: HILLS, BLAKE R 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): SIMMS, CLAYTON A 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: December 27, 1983 
Video 
Tape Number: TAPE Tape Count- 10:45 
CHARGES 
1. AGGRAVATED ASSAULT - 2nd Degree Felony 
Disposition: 01/10/2005 Guilty 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED ASSAULT a 2nd 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah 
State Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 041903671 FS 
Judge: ROBIN W. REESE 
Date: March 14, 2005 
Page 1 
Case No: 041903671 
Date: Mar 14, 2005 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED ASSAULT a 2nd 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 365 day(s) 
SENTENCE FINE 
Charge # 1 Fine: $18500.00 
Suspended: $18500.00 
Total Fine: $18500.00 
Total Suspended: $18500.00 
Total Surcharge: $0 
Total Principal Due- $0 
Plus Interest 
SENTENCE TRUST 
The defendant is to pay the following: 
Restitution: Amount: $11693.00 Plus Interest 
Pay in behalf of: UNKNOWN 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 3 year(s). 
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole. 
Defendant to serve 365 day(s) jail. 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
Usual and ordinary conditions required by the Department of Adult 
Probation & Parole 
Submit to searches of person and property upon the request of any 
Law Enforcement Officel. 
Do not use, consume or possess alcohol or illegal drugs, nor 
associate with any people using, possessing or consuming alcohol or 
illegal drugs. 
Submit to tests of breath and urine upon the request of any Law 
Enforcement Officer. 
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Case No: 041903671 
Date: Mar 14, 2005 
Violate no laws. 
Enter, participate in, and complete any program, counseling, or 
treatment as directed by the Department of Adult Probation and 
Parole. 
Pay restitution as determined by Probation Officer. 
PAY $11,693.00 RESTITUTION 
NO CONTACT WITH VICTIM 
MAINTAIN STABLE RESIDENCE 
MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH AP&P 
SERVE 3 65 DAYS JAIL 
COMPLETE IN-PATIENT PROGRAM / AND AFTERCARE 
COMPLETE ANGER MANAGEMENT COUNSELING 
COMPLETE MENTAL HEALTH COUNSELING 
FOLLOW ALL PROBATION PROGRAMS 
Dated this day of , 20 . 
ROBIN W. REESE 
District Court Judge 
Page 3 (last) 
Third District Court, State of Utah 
SALT LAKE COUNTY COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
450 South State Street, PO Box 1860, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1860 
SENTENCE/JUDGMB:NT/COMMITMENT/ORDER 
Criminal/Traffic 
CI(TY/STATE' Plaintiff Case Number^"" Cf I ' / ? * " ^ 6 // 
Tape Number , C # 
r 
Date -^//'//f S " T,me /^,'(/</ 
Judge/Comm /Ll'SlSt 
Defendant 
DOB J^L/<±]/5_3 
Interpreter 
CHARGES (TJfa {(&#<(£/-. 
~ ^''IHJ*, Plaintiff Counsel _ 
Defense Counsel ( / i C 
Amended 
Amended 
<?z w^J 
at 
fHE COURT SENTENCED THE DEFENDANT AS FOLLOWS: J ~ / ? 1/7 *° 
1) Jail 
Defendant to Commence Serving Jail Sentence 
2) FineAmt $ Susp $ 
Suspended 7* JV0> 
Fee$ Fine Bal $ 
Payment Schedule: Pay $ 
3) Court Costs $ 
per month/1 st Pmt Due 
TOTAL FINE(S) DUE $ 
Last Pmt Due 
X) Community Service/WP. through 
>) Restitution & fixi ( Pay to • Court £ Victim • Show Proof to Courtf / / , fc <^3 < C 
Attorney Fees $ I ^***T- / * - y ^ 
? eo r^^f 
^ 
-S? >) Probation ^ Cf^1^ 
r) Terms of probation: 
0 N o Further Violations 
• AA Meetings 
• Good Behavior pgL AP&P \J ACEC • Other 
/wk 
D Follow Program 
•p No A lcoho l^ y ( ] ^ / / 0 
D Antibuse 
D Employment 
D Proof of 
& Counseling thru , / ^ U ^ / y / / ^ ^ , 
/ month ^ Classes^ ttfn I ^ . ///l^tffi'J^-ftut ? 
D {Tn/Out Treatment * 3 t t fa ^  {{/^CL^/JC^ 
D Health Testing 
G Crime Lab Procedure 
I Plea in Abeyance Diversion 
i Review / / at _ 
x / / tec v & / f- d:/4&&? i£t'&*s 
compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act, individuals 
xJing special accommodations (including auxiliary communicative 
s and services) during this proceeding should call Third District 
jrt at 238-7500 at least three working days prior to the proceeding 
/ 
District Court Judge 
APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITHIN 30 DAYS OF JUDGMENT 
INTEREST WILL BE ADDED IF FINE AND/OR RESTITUTION NOT PAID IN FULL TODAY 
Addendum B 
3RD DISTRICT COURT - WV DEPT. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WEST VALLEY CITY vs. TOM ARMIJO 
E NUMBER 911001218 Other Misdemeanor 
RGES 
Charge 1 - 76-5-102 - SIMPLE ASSAULT 
Class B Misdemeanor Plea: October 18, 1991 Guilty 
Disposition: October 18, 1991 {Guilty Plea} 
1RENT ASSIGNED JUDGE 
WILLIAM A. THORNE 
ITIES 
Defendant - TOM ARMIJO 
1912 W 3395 S 
WVC, UT 84119 
3TATE0FUTAH t 
COUNTY OF SALT UKE f S t 
hand* 
Plaintiff - WEST VALLEY CITY 
PENDANT INFORMATION 
Defendant Name: TOM ARMIJO 
Offense tracking number: 
Date of Birth: November 01, 1964 
Social Security Number: 
Driver License Number: 149512590 
Driver License State: UT 
Law Enforcement Agency: WEST VALLEY POLICE 
Prosecuting Agency: WEST VALLEY CITY 
Agency Case Number: WVP 
Citation Number: A801822 
Violation Date: April 03, 1991 
'COUNT SUMMARY 
LSE NOTE 
^ ^ ^ T ^ k 
2 DEFENDANT'S 
I EXHIBIT 
V-
IOCEEDINGS 
1-04-91 Information filed 
1-04-91 Judge THORNE assigned. 
1-09-91 Arraignment scheduled on April 09, 1991 at 09:00 AM in SECOND 
FLOOR with Judge THORNE. 
convert 
convert 
rinted: 01/06/05 16:10:03 Page 1 
ASE .MUMBER 911001218 Othe r Misdemeanor 
4-09-91 Note 
4-09-91 Note 
4-09-91 Note 
4-09-91 Note 
4-09-91 Note 
Mis Arr Judge William A Thorne janicec 
TAPE: 8 740 COUNT: 0580 janicec 
Deft present w/o counsel janicec 
Defendant advised of rights and waived. janicec 
DEF PG. ON COURTS OWN MOTION, PLEA TO BE HELD IN ABEYANCE 
FOR janicec 
4-09-91 Note: 12 MONTHS WITH PROB TO COURT. TERMS: l.NO OTHER 
VIOLATIONS j anicec 
1-09-91 Note: 2.COMPLETE CCC MATTER MAY BE DISMISSED ON WRITTEN 
MOTION janicec 
1-09-91 Note: Began tracking Diversion Review on 
03/09/92 janicec 
$-19-91 Warrant ordered on: August 19, 1991 Warrant Num: 911007111 Bail 
Allowed 
Bail amount: 8 0 0.00 
.-19-91 Note: FILED: STAY REPORT CCC maryl 
-19-91 Note: WAT/MEL C/O B/W $800 maryl 
-05-91 Warrant issued on: September 05, 1991 Warrant Num: 911007111 
Bail Allowed 
Bail amount: 800,00 
Judge: WILLIAM A. THORNE 
Issue reason: The defendant failed to comply with the 
terms of probations as alleged in the Order to Show Cause. 
-05-91 Note: BENCH WARRANT batch issued - JUDGE WAT Issued - 09/05/91janicec 
Failure to comply with probation janicec 
Bail amount ordered: 800.00 janicec 
Warrant fee: janicec 
-17-91 Arraignment scheduled on October 18, 1991 at 08:31 AM in SECOND 
FLOOR with Judge THORNE. loris 
-18-91 Warrant recalled on: October 18, 1991 Warrant num: 911007111 
Recall reason: Based on the probable cause statement. 
-18-91 Note: WAT/JFC T9283 C1027 DPWOC. DEF FAILED TO COMPLETE 
COUNSELING AT janicec 
18-91 Note: CCC. DEF INDICATES WHEN HE SPOKE WITH CCC REPRESENTATIVE 
AT ARR, janicec 
18-91 Note: THEY INDICATED CCC HAD A DRUG COUNSELING PROGRAM TEAT 
WOULD BE janicec 
18-91 Note: BENSFICIAL TO HIM AS HE FELT THE ALST WAS DUE TO HIS DRUG 
PROBL- janicec 
18-91 Note: EM. WHEN HE WENT TO CCC HE WAS TOLD THERE WASNT A DRUG 
PROGRAM janicec 
18-91 Note: FOR HIM. C/O PLEA TO BE ENTERED TODAY, SENT IMPOSED: 180 
DAYS janicec 
18-91 Note: JAL, $1000 FINE. SUSP BOTH JAIL AND FINE ON HAVING AN 
ASSESSMENT j anicec 
18-91 Note: AT OLYMPUS VIEW HOSPITAL AND FOLLOW THRU WITH ALL 
RECOMMENDATION j anicec 
18-91 Note: OF OLYMPUS VIEW. DEF TO PROVIDE LETTER OF ENROLLMENT 
WITHIN 30 janicec 
-05-91 Note 
-05-91 Note 
-05-91 Note 
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NUMBER 911001218 Other Misdemeanor 
L8-
L8-
L8-
L8-
12-
12-
12-
12-
12-
12-
09-
24-
24-
24-
04-
04-
•04-
-04-
-09-
-91 
-91 
-91 
-91 
-91 
-91 
-91 
-91 
-91 
-91 
-92 
-92 
-92 
-92 
-92 
-92 
-92 
-92 
-92 
Note: 
Note: 
DAYS 
Began tracking Fine Stay Review on 
11/18/91 
Note: Began tracking Probation (Court) Review on 
08/11/92 
Note: 
Note: 
Chrg: 76-5-102 Plea: Guilty Find: Guilty Plea 
FILED; LETTER FROM OLYMPUS VIEW, C/O 1 THRU 5 TO BE 
INCORPORTED 
Note: INTO PROB TERMS. ON LETTER. 1. OUT-PATIIENT CHEMICAL 
DEPENDENCY 
Note: 
VMH. 
Note: 
Note: 
Note: 
Note: 
Note: 
Note: 
Note: 
Note: 
VIEW 
Note: 
TREATMENT AT VMH, 2. INDIVIDUAL OUT-PATIENT COUNSELING A 
DRUG AND ALCOHO UNIT. 3. IMVOLVEMENT INPSYCHIATRIC, 4. 
janicec 
janicec 
janicec 
janicec 
vickiem 
vickiem 
vickiem 
vickiem 
INVOLVEMNT IN COUPLES THERAPY, 5. ATTENDANCE TO NARCOTICSvickiem 
MEETINGS, TWICE WEEKLY. 
Ended tracking of Fine Stay 
NOTE: I CHECKED COMPUTER AND DEF HAS NO NEW VIOLATIONS, 
REQUEST TO OLYMPUS VIEW FOR DEF•S COMPLIANCE 
Ended tracking of Probation (Court) 
WAT/MEL THERE IS NO WAY TO CONFIRM COMPLIANCE W/OLYMPUS 
AS 
THEIR RECORDS HAVE BEEN DESTROYED, IF ALL OTHER 
REQUIREMENTS 
Note: 
Note: 
Note: 
HAVE BEEN COMPLETED, CLOSE CASE 
Entered case disposition of: Closed 
Archive Box Number entered was CR0002 
vickiem 
cindye 
kac 
kac 
kac 
maryl 
maryl 
maryl 
maryl 
bat 
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Addendum C 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
AMENDMENTS 
AMENDMENT 6 
USCS Const. Amend. 6 (2005) 
Rights of the accused. 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an 
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which 
district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause 
of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process 
for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence. 
Addendum D 
Utah Const. Art. I, §12 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
Copyright (c) 2005 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. a member of the LexisNexis Group. 
All rights reserved. 
*** STATUTES CURRENT THROUGH THE 2004 FOURTH SPECIAL SESSION *** 
*** ANNOTATIONS CURRENT THROUGH 2005 UT 7, 2005 UT APP 37 *** 
*** AND JANUARY 27, 2005 (FEDERAL CASES) *** 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
ARTICLE I. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS 
Utah Const. Art. I, § 12 (2005) 
§12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in person and by 
counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to 
testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory 
process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by 
an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, 
and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused person, before final 
judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The 
accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to 
testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in 
jeopardy for the same offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the function of that 
examination is limited to determining whether probable cause exists unless otherwise provided 
by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as 
defined by statute or rule in whole or in part at any preliminary examination to determine 
probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with respect to release of the defendant if 
appropriate discovery is allowed as defined by statute or rule. 
HISTORY: Const. 1896; L. 1994, S.J.R. 6, § 1. 
NOTES: 
AMENDMENT NOTES. - T h e 1994 amendment was proposed by Laws 1994, SJ.R. 6, § 1 , 
approved by the voters on November 8, 1994, and took effect on January 1 , 1995. The 
amendment added the second paragraph. 
Addendum E 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-402 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
Copyright (c) 2005 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. a member of the LexisNexis Group. 
All rights reserved. 
*** STATUTES CURRENT THROUGH THE 2004 FOURTH SPECIAL SESSION *** 
*** ANNOTATIONS CURRENT THROUGH 2005 UT 7, 2005 UT APP 37 *** 
*** AND JANUARY 27, 2005 (FEDERAL CASES) *** 
TITLE 76. UTAH CRIMINAL CODE 
CHAPTER 2. PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 
PART 4. JUSTIFICATION EXCLUDING CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 
GO TO CODE ARCHIVE DIRECTORY FOR THIS JURISDICTION 
Utah Code Ann. § 76^2-402 (2005) 
§ 76-2-402. Force in defense of person — Forcible felony defined 
(1) A person is justified in threatening or using force against another when and to the extent 
that he or she reasonably believes that force is necessary to defend himself or a third person 
against such other's imminent use of unlawful force. However, that person is justified in using 
force intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily injury only if he or she reasonably 
believes that force is necessary to prevent death or serious bodily injury to himself or a third 
person as a result of the other's imminent use of unlawful force, or to prevent the commission of 
a forcible felony. 
(2) A person is not justified in using force under the circumstances specified in Subsection (1) if 
he or she: 
(a) initially provokes the use of force against himself with the intent to use force as an excuse 
to inflict bodily harm upon the assailant; 
(b) is attempting to commit, committing, or fleeing after the commission or attempted 
commission of a felony; or 
(c) (i) was the aggressor or was engaged in a combat by agreement, unless he withdraws from 
the encounter and effectively communicates to the other person his intent to do so and, 
notwithstanding, the other person continues or threatens to continue the use of unlawful force; 
and 
(ii) for purposes of Subsection (i) the following do not, by themselves, constitute "combat by 
agreement": 
(A) voluntarily entering into or remaining in an ongoing relationship; or 
(B) entering or remaining in a place where one has a legal right to be. 
(3) A person does not have a duty to retreat from the force or threatened force described in 
Subsection (1) in a place where that person has lawfully entered or remained, except as provided 
in Subsection (2)(c). 
(4) For purposes of this section, a forcible felony includes aggravated assault, mayhem, 
aggravated murder, murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, and aggravated kidnapping, rape, forcible 
sodomy, rape of a child, object rape, object rape of a child, sexual abuse of a child, aggravated 
sexual abuse of a child, and aggravated sexual assault as defined in Title 76, Chapter 5, and 
arson, robbery, and burglary as defined in Title 76, Chapter 6. Any other felony offense which 
involves the use of force or violence against a person so as to create a substantial danger of death 
or serious bodily injury also constitutes a forcible felony. Burglary of a vehicle, defined in 
Section 76-6-204, does not constitute a forcible felony except when the vehicle is occupied at the 
time unlawful entry is made or attempted. 
(5) In determining imminence or reasonableness under Subsection (1), the trier of fact may 
consider, but is not limited to, any of the following factors: 
(a) the nature of the danger; 
(b) the immediacy of the danger; 
(c) the probability that the unlawful force would result in death or serious bodily injury; 
(d) the other's prior violent acts or violent propensities; and 
(e) any patterns of abuse or violence in the parties' relationship. 
HISTORY: C. 1953, 76-2-402, enacted by L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-2-402; 1974, ch. 32, § 6; 
1991, ch. 10, §5; 1994, ch. 26, § 1. 
NOTES: 
LEGISLATIVE INTENT. -Laws 1994, ch. 26, § 2 provides: "Amendments made by this act to 
Section 76-2-402, regarding self defense, are intended to clarify that justification of the use 
of force in defense of a person applies equally to all persons including victims of abuse in 
ongoing relationships. It is intended that otherwise competent evidence regarding a victim's 
response to patterns of domestic abuse or violence be considered by the trier of fact in 
determining imminence or reasonableness in accordance with that section, and that the 
evidence be considered when useful in understanding the perceptions or conduct of a 
witness." 
Addendum F 
URE Rule 405 
UTAH COURT RULES ANNOTATED 
Copyright (c) 2005 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. 
a member of the LexisNexis Group. 
All Rights Reserved 
* THIS DOCUMENT IS CURRENT THROUGH CHANGES RECEIVED AS OF MARCH 1, 
2005* 
* Annotations current through 2004 UT 97, 2004 UT 418, and December 1, 2004 * 
STATE RULES 
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
ARTICLE IV. RELEVANCY AND ITS LIMITS 
URE Rule 405 (2005) 
Rule 405. Methods of proving character. 
(a) Reputation or opinion. In all cases in which evidence of character or a trait of character of a 
person is admissible, proof may be made by testimony as to reputation or by testimony in the 
form of an opinion. On cross-examination, inquiry is allowable into relevant specific instances of 
conduct. 
(b) Specific instances of conduct. In cases in which character or a trait of character of a person is 
essential element of a charge, claim, or defense, proof may also be made of specific instances of 
that person's conduct. 
HISTORY: Amended effective October 1, 1992 
NOTES: 
Advisory Committee Note. -- This rule is the federal rule, verbatim, and is consistent with 
Rule 46, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971) and the decisions of the Utah Supreme Court. Cf. 
State v. Howard, 544 P.2d 466 (Utah 19751. Rule 47, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971) 
appears to be covered by subdivisions (a)(1) or (b) of Rule 404. 
Addendum G 
State of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Ryan D. Nelson, Defendant and Appellant. 
CaseNo.20010753-CA 
COURT OF APPEALS OF UTAH 
2004 UT App 421; 2004 Utah App. LEXIS 489 
November 18, 2004, Filed 
NOTICE: [*1] NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION 
PRIOR HISTORY: Fourth District, Provo Department. The Honorable Gary D. Stott. 
DISPOSITION: Reversed and remanded. 
COUNSEL: Margaret P. Lindsay, Orem, and Michael D. Esplin, Provo, for Appellan. 
Mark L. Shurtleff and Brett J. DelPorto, Salt Lake City, for Appellee. 
JUDGES: James Z. Davis, Judge. WE CONCUR: Norman H. Jackson, Judge, William A. 
Thorne Jr., Judge. 
OPINIONBY: James Z. Davis 
OPINION: MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Before Judges Davis, Jackson, and Thorne. 
DAVIS, Judge: 
Defendant Ryan D. Nelson appeals his conviction of forcible sodomy, a first degree felony. We 
reverse. 
Defendant argues that his trial counsel's failure to file the required statutory notice of alibi, see 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-14-2 (2003), constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. / / w ¥ T o prevail 
on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant must establish that "(1) counsel's 
performance was deficient below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment, and 
(2) counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant." State v. Martinez, 2001 UT 12, P 16. 26 
P.3d203; see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 
2052(1984). 
It is [*2] undisputed that Defendant's trial counsel failed to comply with section 77-14-2 and 
that, as a result, the trial court did not allow two of Defendant's alibi witnesses to testify at trial. 
We conclude that this failure constituted performance that "was deficient below an objective 
standard of reasonable professional judgment." Martinez, 2001 UT 12 at P 16. Therefore, 
Defendant has established the first prong of the test for ineffective assistance of counsel. 
/ A 2?To establish the second prong, Defendant must "'show that there is a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome.'" Carter v. Galetka, 2001 UT 96, P 31, 44 P.3d 626 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
694). The State argues that the testimony of Defendant's two alibi witnesses "could not have 
affected the outcome of the trial" because those witnesses would have testified about Defendant's 
whereabouts on a day other than the one when the alleged incident occurred. The State asserts 
that the alleged incident occurred [*3] on the "afternoon of August 3, 2000" and that the two 
alibi witnesses would have testified about Defendant's whereabouts on August 4, 2000. This 
argument is without merit and is unsupported by the record. 
The record contains the affidavits of both alibi witnesses, which provide, as the State correctly 
asserts, that if they had been allowed to testify at trial, both would have testified about 
Defendant's whereabouts on August 4, 2000. However, the record does nol indicate that August 
3, 2000 is the only date relevant to the alleged incident. On the contrary, after reviewing the 
record, it is clear that August 4, 2000 was within the time period the State believed the alleged 
incident occurred, nl As such, the testimony of the two alibi witnesses concerning Defendant's 
whereabouts on August 4, 2000 would have been relevant to Defendant's alibi defense. n2 This is 
particularly true where the only alibi witness who was allowed to testify at trial — Defendant's 
father — provided inconsistent testimony and was Defendant's blood relative. The jury may well 
have assigned more credibility to Defendant's alibi defense had the two additional alibi witnesses 
been allowed to testify. Moreover, [*4] our review of the record indicates that, contrary to the 
State's assertion, there is not overwhelming evidence of Defendant's guilt. Accordingly, we 
conclude that '"there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's [failure to comply with 
section 77-14-21, the result of the proceeding would have been different."' Galetka, 2001 UT 96 
at P 31 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). Therefore, Defendant has established the second 
prong of the test for ineffective assistance of counsel. 
- Footnotes 
nl The information charging Defendant provides that the alleged incident occurred "on or about 
August 04, 2000." In addition, during the prosecutor's opening statement at trial, he referenced 
the information and indicated that the alleged incident occurred "on or about August 4 of the 
year 2000." Further, the instructions to the jury indicated that the alleged incident occurred "on 
or about August 4, 2000." 
n2 On remand from our order pursuant to rule 23B of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the 
trial court also found that the testimony of the two alibi witnesses "was relevant to the issues 
presented at trial and to the defense presented by the Defendant." 
- - End Footnotes + [*5] 
Defendant has successfully established thai he received ineffective assistance of counsel. n3 
Therefore, we reverse his conviction and remand for a new trial. 
— Footnotes 
n3 Because Defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim is dispositive of his appeal, we 
need not address his remaining arguments. However, we note his argument that the trial court 
erred by inflexibly applying Utah Code section 77-14-2 to conclude that Defendant's two alibi 
witnesses could not testify. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-14-2 (2003). Section 77-14-2 provides that 
if a party fails to comply with its requirements, a trial court has discretion to exclude alibi 
evidence, but is not required to do so. See id. § 77-14-2(3), (4) (providing that if a party fails to 
comply with the requirements of section 77-14-2, the court "may exclude evidence offered to 
establish or rebut alibi," or "for good cause shown, waive the requirements o f section 77-14-2 
(emphasis added)); State v. Ortiz, 712 P.2d 218, 219-20 (Utah 1985) (stating that the thrust of 
section 77-14-2 "is to allow a court, for good cause, to permit alibi testimony that has not been 
properly noticed," and that "the overriding consideration in evaluating any notice-of-alibi claim 
must be the avoidance of unfair surprise or prejudice to either party, not an exaltation of 
technical formalities"). While not clearly apparent from the record, it appears as though the trial 
court may have failed to exercise any discretion in its application of section 77--14-2. However, it 
also appears that this failure is intertwined with, and likely the result of, the ineffective assistance 
Defendant received from his trial counsel. Accordingly, we resolve Defendant's appeal based 
upon his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 
- End Footnotes 
James Z. Davis, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
William A. Thome Jr., Judge 
Addendum H 
2004 UTApp 351; 2004 Utah App. LEXIS 365, * 
State of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Blake Bleazard, Defendant and Appellant. 
CaseNo.20030402-CA 
COURT OF APPEALS OF UTAH 
2004 UT App 351; 2004 Utah App. LEXIS 365 
October 7, 2004, Filed 
NOTICE: [*1] NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION 
PRIOR HISTORY: Third District, Salt Lake Department. The Honorable Dennis M. Fuchs 
DISPOSITION: Reversed. 
COUNSEL: Gregory G. Skordas and Jack M. Morgan, Salt Lake City, for Appellant 
Mark L. Shurtleff and Matthew D. Bates, Salt Lake City, for Appellee 
JUDGES: Judith M. Billings, Presiding Judge. I CONCUR: James Z. Davis, Judge, Gregory K. 
Orme, Judge (concurring in the result) 
OPINIONBY: Judith M. Billings 
OPINION: 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Before Judges Billings, Davis, and Orme. 
BILLINGS, Presiding Judge: 
Defendant Blake Bleazard appeals his conviction of rape, a first degree felony. See Utah Code 
Ann. $ 76-5-402 (1999). We reverse. 
At trial, the sole issue was whether the sexual intercourse was consensual. On appeal, Defendant 
argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. //A/"?"A11 criminal defendants have a 
right to effective assistance of counsel. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 80 L. 
Ed. 2d 674.104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). "^TTo demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, "the 
defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient," and "that the deficient 
performance prejudiced the defense." Id. Counsel's performance [*2] is measured by "an 
objective standard of reasonableness," id. at 688, and the resulting prejudice is measured by 
whether there would have been a reasonable probability of a different result "sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. at 694. 
Defendant argues that trial counsel's failure to present testimony from two potential witnesses — 
James and Brandy Lefler (the Leflers) — at trial constituted ineffective assistance of counsel, nl 
Defendant's trial counsel subpoenaed the Leflers, but failed to provide adequate notice to the 
State as required by rule 16(d) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. On this basis, the trial 
court refused 1o permit these witnesses to testify at trial. "^^Failure to provide adequate notice 
clearly constitutes deficient performance on the part of Defendant's trial counsel, and thus the 
issue is whether the absence of their testimony was prejudicial. 
Footnotes - -
nl Defendant also claims that trial counsel made the same error for four additional witnesses; 
however, given our disposition of this appeal, we need not address Defendant's additional claims. 
End Footnotes [*3] 
The Leflers were prepared to testify that the victim had falsely accused James Lefler of rape 
eight years earlier. This testimony would have been admissible to attack the credibility of the 
victim under rule 608 of the Utah Rules of Evidence; because the outcome of the trial crucially 
hinged upon whether the jury believed the victim's version of events, such testimony would have 
been important to Defendant's defense at trial. 
Defendant's trial counsel made an additional error. Defendant moved to exclude a videotape of 
Defendant's police interview because it was highly prejudicial and its only relevance was to 
show that Defendant had intercourse with the victim, a fact to which Defendant had stipulated. 
Even if the Defendant's stipulation did not strip the videotape evidence of its relevance, see State 
v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 475 (Utah 1988), 1he trial court considered the question of whether the 
videotape's probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to be 
a close call. See Utah R. Evid. 403. 
While the trial court concluded that the videotape was admissible, it directed Defendant's counsel 
to prepare a cautionary instruction [*4] to mitigate the prejudicial effect of inflammatory 
comments on the videotape. Implicit in the trial court's direction to counsel is a recognition that 
the videotape testimony, absent a cautionary instruction, was likely overly prejudicial. Trial 
counsel's failure to prepare the instruction in these circumstances constituted deficient 
performance. 
Trial counsel's failure to provide the cautionary instruction, coupled with the absence of the 
Leflers' testimony, resulted in prejudice sufficient to undermine our confidence in the jury's 
verdict. Thus, Defendant did not receive effective assistance of counsel. See Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-94, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). 
We therefore reverse Defendant's conviction. 
Judith M. Billings, 
Presiding Judge 
I CONCUR: 
James Z. Davis, Judge 
CONCURBY: James Z. Davis, Judge, Gregory K. Orme, Judge (concurring in the result) 
CONCUR: I agree with my colleagues that the conviction should be reversed and the case 
remanded for a new trial. I believe, however, that the pivotal error is more fundamental than a 
mere failure to propound a cautionary instruction. In my view, even if the videotape was 
admissible [*5] as substantive evidence and even if it had some marginal probative value 
notwithstanding Defendant's consistent acknowledgment that he had consensual sex with his 
friend, this minimal value was so thoroughly outweighed by the "danger of unfair prejudice" that 
it was error for the court to have admitted it. Utah R. Evid. 403.1 believe our decision to reverse 
the conviction should be premised on this basis. 
I wish also to register a cautionary note for any retrial which might ensue on remand. It should 
not be assumed that the main opinion represents "law of the case" to the effect that the videotape 
may properly be admitted as substantive evidence, so long as an appropriate cautionary 
instruction is given. On the contrary, this court has not validated the trial court's conclusion that 
Defendant's stipulation did not render the videotape irrelevant. On the contrary, the majority 
engages in "even i f analysis in treating the relevance question. In short, while it is clear form the 
main opinion that even if the videotape may properly be admitted, defendant is entitled to a 
cautionary instruction, it is not clear that the videotape actually is admissible. On retrial, the 
State [*6] would be well-advised, if it feels the need to again introduce the videotape, to be 
much more focused in explaining the rationale for such admission in a case where Defendant 
chose not to testify, as is his right, while simultaneously acknowledging that he had sex with his 
friend, albeit consensual sex, and nothing in his videotaped statement is to the contrary. 
